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JOHN BUCKLER
"Gentlemen may cry, Peace, Peace!
—
but there is no peace."
Patrick Henry
The aim of this piece is to examine a congeries of diplomatic, political, and
legal arrangements and obligations that linked the Greeks, Macedonians,
and Persians in various complicated ways during Philip's final years. The
ties among them all were then often tangled and now imperfectly
understood and incompletely documented. These matters evoke such
concepts as the King's Peace and the Common Peace, and involve a number
of treaties, some bilateral between Philip and individual states, others
broader, as with the Peace of Philokrates between himself and his allies and
the Athenians and theirs, and finally the nature of Philip's settlement with
the Greeks in 338/7. In the background there always stood the King, who
never formally renounced the rights that he enjoyed under the King's Peace
of 386, even though he could seldom directly enforce them. It is an irony of
history that Philip used the concept of a common peace in Greece both to
exclude the King from Greek affairs and also as a tool of war against him.
By so doing, Philip rejected the very basis of the King's Peace as it was
originally drafted and later implemented. In its place he resurrected the
memory of the days when the Greeks had thwarted Xerxes' invasion, and
fanned the desire for retaliation of past wrongs, a theme that Alexander
would also later put to good use.'
The original version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Association of
Ancient Historians in Los Angeles on 4 May 1990. It is a distinct pleasure to offer heartfelt
thanks to my friends and co-panelists Professors Ernst Badian and Stephen Ruzicka for their
many helpful and stimulating ideas. We have not always agreed, and they are by no means
responsible for any weaknesses of this piece, but their help has been indispensable. Only after
this article was in proof did M. Jehne, Koine Eirene: Untersuchungen zu den Befriedungs- und
Slabilisierungsbemuhungen in der griechischen Poliswelt des 4. Jahrhunderls v. Chr., Hermes
Einzelschr. 63 (Stuttgart 1994) appear, too late for inclusion here. Although a fine piece of
scholarship, it does not address many of the specific questions raised in this piece.
* Proof that the King was instrumental in establishing the concept of a general peace comes
from Xen. Hell. 5. 1. 31-32. in which he writes 'Apta^ep^Tiq PaaiXevq vojii^ei 6iKaiov . . .
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The year 346 was remarkable for three peace treaties, each separate,
although all involved at least some of the same numerous belligerents. The
first was the Phokian general Phalaikos' surrender to Philip that ended the
hostilities between them.^ The next was the Peace of Philokrates between
Philip and the Athenians that ended their conflict for control of the
northwestern Aegean.^ The terms of the Peace of Philokrates bound most,
but not all, of the major participants of the "War for Amphipolis.'"* Thebes
and its allies were not considered a party to it, even though Thebes itself had
only the year before concluded a separate alliance with Philip.^ Last-minute
efforts to include Phokis failed; and Kersebleptes, who had played such a
prominent, if undistinguished, role in the conflict was expressly excluded
from it.^ The only Athenian allies who formally participated in it were the
members of the Second Athenian Confederacy. Despite the number of
Greeks involved, this treaty can in no way be considered a Common Peace,
and was not so referred to in antiquity.^ That much should have been clear
from the testimony of Aischines, who repeatedly mentions the failure of the
Athenians to interest other Greeks in peace with Philip.* This simple fact is
hardly surprising, inasmuch as most of them were not at war with him,
which of itself made a peace treaty pointless. Nor did they wish
unnecessarily to become embroiled with him. Finally, the Peace of
Philokrates did not include the King, who had played no part in these
events.
Taq 6e a.}JKac, 'EXhr]vi5a<; noXzic, Kal |iiKpaq Kal \iier(aXac, auxov6n.o-u<; dcpeivai. D. M.
Lewis, Sparta and Persia (Leiden 1977) 147 and E. Badian in M. A. Flower and M. Toher
(eds.), Georgica: Greek Studies in Honour of George Cawkwell, BICS Suppl. 58 (London
1991) 37 emphasize that he was ending a bilateral war with the Spartans and their allies, basing
their argument on the next clause beginning with onoTepoi. If limited merely to that goal, one
can reasonably expect terminology identical with that found in Thucydides 8. 37, which
includes only "the Lakedaimonians and their allies" on the Greek side. The King encompassed
in the Peace of 386 even those states that had not participated in the war, a view independently
proposed by R. Sealey, Demosthenes and his Time (New York and Oxford 1993) 13. Lewis
and Badian do not realize that the King used his diktat both to end the Corinthian War and also
to settle to his satisfaction the affairs of all the Greek states.
^ H. Bengtson, Die Staatsvertrdge des Altertums U^ (Munich 1975) 330 [hereafter Bengtson,
SdAU^].
3 Bengtson. SdA H^ 329; T. T. B. Ryder. Koine Eirene (Oxford 1965) 145-49, with earlier
bibliography; J. R. Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism (London 1976) 107-26; G. L.
Cawkwell. Philip ofMacedon (Boston and London 1978) 91-113; N. G. L. Hammond and G.
T. Griffith, A History ofMacedonia H (Oxford 1979) 329-41; R. M. Errington, AJAH 6 (1981)
73-77; J. Buckler. Philip II and the Sacred War, Mnemosyne Suppl. 109 (Leiden 1989) 114-
42; R. Urban, Der Konigsfrieden von 387/86 v. Chr. (Stuttgart 1991).
* For the term, see Isok. 5. 2; Aischin. 2. 70; Dem. 5. 14.
5 Bengtson, SdA H^ 327; Hammond and Griffith (above, note 3) 266; D. E. KeUy,
Antichthon 14 (1980) 64-83; J. Buckler in H. Beister and J. Buckler (eds). BOIOTIKA
(Munich 1989) 160-61.
<* Aischin. 3. 73-74; 2. 84; Buckler (above, note 3) 132-34.
' Diod. 16. 77. 2, who in fact pays little attention to this treaty. F. Hampl, Die griechischen
Staatsvertrdge des 4. Jahrhunderts (Leipzig 1938) 58-59; G. T. Griffith. JHS 59 (1939) 71-79;
Ryder (above, note 3) 149.
"Aischin. 2. 57-61; 3. 58.
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The last treaty came when the Amphiktyonic Council accepted the
surrender of the Phokians, and resumed control of the sanctuary of Apollo at
Delphoi.' Himself not then a member of the Delphic Amphiktyony, Philip
nonetheless participated in the rites that concluded hostilities, and used the
votes of his allies to establish a peace to his and their liking.^^ Moreover, a
Delphian inscription makes it abundantly clear that only some members of
the Amphiktyony were formally involved in these events. Others were
conspicuously absent.^ ^ Sparta, Corinth, and Sikyon remained passive in
the Peloponnesos; and when Philip explicitly called upon the Athenians for
help in liberating the sanctuary, they refused because of fear.^^ Furthermore,
the term "Common Peace" is nowhere found in the document. Nor should
it even be expected, for the Amphiktyony was a religious, not a political,
association.'^ The King was neither a member of the Amphiktyony nor a
participant in the plundering of Apollo's treasures. Therefore, there was
absolutely no reason for him to be a party to these events. Philip had simply
made possible a settlement by most, but not all, of the Amphiktyons
concerning the sanctuary. He had in fact ended a war that had neither
involved all the states of Greece nor had anything to do with the King.
Diodoros (16. 60. 3), however, states that the Amphiktyons established
a "common peace and concord of the Greeks" (koivtiv eiptivriv Kal
6|x6voiav xoic, "EXXrioiv), a phrase reminiscent of Andokides' "common
peace and freedom for all of the Greeks" (Tiaoi Toiq "E'kXT\oi koivt^v
eipTivTiv Kttl eX.e\)0ep(av, 3. 17). Here again the adjective koine modifies
both nouns, and cannot be taken as a technical term. It is thus wall to ask
what Diodoros meant by a "common peace." The use of it in the so-called
"Reply to the Satraps"''* and by ps.-Demosthenes (17, Concerning the
Treaty with Alexander) clearly dates it to the fourth century, and perhaps
Diodoros found it in Ephoros. The latter, however, should not be assumed,
if only because not one example of the phrase koine eirene appears in the
238 fragments of Ephoros that Jacoby prints in Die Fragmente der
griechischen Historiker. Diodoros' usage deserves separate treatment, but
one best confined to an appendix (see below). The point here is that the
Amphiktyonic Council could not officially conclude a "Common Peace," as
that term is generally understood by scholars today, nor did it attempt to do
'Bengtson.5<i4n2 331.
^°Fouilles de Delphes m.5 19. line 74; Dem. 5. 13; 19. 24; Diod. 16. 60. 1. Philip only
later became a member of the Council; see ps.-Dem. 11. 4 and G. Roux, L'Amphictionie,
Delphes et le temple d Apollon au IVe siecle (Lyons 1979) 18, 166-67.
'' Fouilles de Delphes 10.5 19. lines 71. 75.
12 Dem. 5. 14; 19. 51; Aischin. 2. 137.
'^ E. A. Freeman, History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy (London 1893)
chapter 3; Roux (above, note 10) chapter 1; E.-J. Gehrke. Jenseits von Athen und Sparta
(Munich 1986) 166-68.
i'*Bengtson.5<i4n2 292.
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so.'^ In short, neither the Peace of Philokrates nor the end of the Sacred
War constituted a "Common Peace" analogous to the settlement that
Artaxerxes dictated to Antalkidas in 387/6 and again in 375 or to Pelopidas
in 367/6.'^ Nor were these treaties of 346 identical with that made after the
battle of Mantineia in 362.'^ In 346 there was no single, joint convention of
the Greeks and no one formal, general treaty of peace mutually accepted.
Instead, most of the major and many of the minor Greek states had simply
settled their differences for the moment in separate situations and under
separate treaties, and that without the participation of the King.
It remains to observe what Philip and the Greeks made of this state of
affairs. The general response of the Greeks, when it can be documented at
all, was largely favorable to Philip, as even the Athenians grudgingly
admitted.'^ The Boiotians and Thessalians were pleased by Philip's
diplomatic accomplishments. Demosthenes and Aischines, for once in
agreement on a topic, realized that Athens had virtually simultaneously lost
two wars. In the process, Athens had also lost Euboia, and Phokis was
already politically dissected. The Peloponnesian allies of Thebes saw in
Philip one willing to assist their friend and to continue the policies of
Epameinondas.'^ Although consensus elsewhere in the Peloponnesos was
lacking, that was nothing more than a reflection of normal Greek politics
there, and yet another sign that many states did not consider the treaties of
346 as a "Common Peace." In Elis the citizenry was hotly divided between
those who championed Philip and those who opposed him (Dem. 19. 260).
In Megara Philip's supporters were so strong that Demosthenes (19. 294-
95, 334) claimed that they almost handed the area to him. The Arkadians
and the Argives openly honored Philip for his efforts (Dem. 19. 261). Thus,
by 346 Philip had won new friends in a region where his influence had
previously been negligible, and he was beginning to draw the noose around
the Athenian neck. Furthermore, he did so solely on the basis of his own
achievements without reference to any "Common Peace" and without
drawing unwelcome attention from the King.
If the point needs any further demonstration, the history of the
following years readily provides it. As early as 344 Demosthenes
complained that Philip was breaking the Peace of Philokrates, which he
describes as a treaty only between Macedonia and Athens.^^ Although he
'^ In 368 Philiskos tried to restore peace at a meeting in Delphoi (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 27; Diod.
15. 70. 2), but his presence there was independent of the Amphiktyonic Council. Delphoi, like
Geneva today, was presumably chosen as a neutral spot. See also Ryder (above, note 3) 134-
35; J. Buckler, The Theban Hegemony, 371-362 BC (Cambridge, MA 1980) 102-04.
•^ Bengtson, SdA E^ 242, 265, and (for 371) 269; for Pelopidas, see Buckler (previous note)
151-60.
'^ Bengtson, SdA 11^ 292, with bibliography.
>^ Dem. 18. 219-20, 334; Aischin. 2. 119-20.
'5 CawkweU (above, note 3) 108-13; Buckler (above, note 15) 145-47; G. Wirth, PhilippII.
(Stuttgart 1985) 95-98; M. Errington, Geschichte Makedoniens (Munich 1986) 75-76.
^ Dem. 6. 2; see also ps.-Dem. 7. 30.
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also claims that Philip had designs on all of Greece, it is clear that most
Greeks thought otherwise, and preferred to let Athens settle its own
differences with Philip. Nor for that matter is there any evidence to suggest
that Philip then entertained thoughts of the conquest of Greece. He had far
too much to do in the northern Aegean to think of further fields of conquest
to the south. Decisive proof of the point comes from the embassy of Python
of Byzantion to Athens, also in 344.21 python and other ambassadors from
Philip and his allies traveled to Athens to settle a dispute over the
possession of Halonnesos. Python proposed to submit the question to the
legal procedure of symbole and any other differences between Philip and
Athens to arbitration.^^ Neither symbole nor arbitration had hitherto been a
part of a Common Peace in the classical period. Symbole was a commercial
contract between two states in which any dispute was to be settled in
court.23 Arbitration was normally a feature of peace treaties between two
powers, such as that found in the Thirty Years' Truce and the Peace of
Nikias.^ Halonnesos was itself unimportant, but it provided the occasion to
review the clauses of the Peace of Philokrates.^ Some Athenians urged in
response that the peace be amended and others that it be rescinded in order
to regain Amphipolis, Poteidaia, and other places.^^ Still another ps.-
Demosthenes, perhaps in this case Hegesippos, states specifically that the
peace was limited to Athens, Philip, and their allies, and suggests that other
Greeks should be included so that it could become a real and generally
shared peace. ^^ Here is additional contemporary testimony that nothing so
^^ Hammond and Griffith (above, note 3) 493-95; Wirth (above, note 19) 1 15.
22Dem. 18. 136; ps.-Dem. 7. 7. 12-14; Plut. Mor. 804a-b.
^ U. Kahrsiedt, "duupoXfi. cnifipoXov 1." RE IV A (1931) 1088-90.
^ Bengtson, SdA 11^ 156, 183; M. N. Tod, International Arbitration amongst the Greeks
(Oxford 1913) 179. Ryder (above, note 3) 84-85, 140-44 suggests arbitration as pan of the
Peace of 362 on the authority of S. Accame, La lega ateniense del seculo IV a.C. (Rome 1941)
175, but there is actually no evidence for it. Arbitration cannot be proven an ingredient in the
Common Peace even in the late Hellenistic period: W. Dittenberger, Sylloge Inscriptionum
Graecarum U^ (Leipzig 1917) 665, Unes 19-20. See also J. A. O. Larsen, CP 34 (1939) 378;
39 (1944) 160; Ryder 158-59. 161. but even here the evidence is at best inconclusive: M. N.
Tod. Greek Historical Inscriptions U {Oxford 1948) 179.
^ If ps.-Dem. 12 truly came from Philip's hand, it would suggest that Philip also took the
occasion to enjoy some fun at Athenian expense; see 12. 13-15, in which the author
remorselessly proves the idiocy of the Athenian case. On the authenticity of the letter, see F.
Wiist, Philipp II. von Makedonien und Griechenland in den Jahren von 346 bis 338 (Munich
1938) 133-36; H. Bengtson, Griechische Geschichte* (Munich 1969) 301. According to ps.-
Dem. 7. 33, the letter was still in the bouleuterion.
^^ Ps.-Dem. 7. 13, 18, 22-23, 26-27; os.-Dem. 12. 8; 7. 18 alone argues against the
statement of Cawkwell ([above, note 3] 124) that Philip suggested any amendments to the
Peace of Philokrates (see also 7. 7-1 1). Indeed, Philip claimed (7. 32-33) that he had never
agreed to amend the peace, which fuUy explains his offer only of arbitration.
^' On the authorship of ps.-Dem. 7, see A. Lesky, A History ofGreek Literature, Eng. trans.
(London 1966) 604. The words of ps.-Dem. 7. 30-31 have special importance: Hepi 6e xou
etepox) enavopGcojiaxoq, o uneiq ev tp eipfiv^^ eTtavopGowoGe, Touq aXXowq "EXKr\vac^, oaoi
(ifi Koivajvcuoi xfic; eiprivTic;, eXe\)0epov)(; Kai a\>xovb\io\>c^ elvai. Km edv tk; en' autouq
(rcpaxe\)T;i, PoriGeiv xovq Koivcovovvxaq xfii; eiprivTic;, fiYoiijievoi kuI 6iKaiov xouxo Kai
(piXdvGpoMtov, \ir\ fiovov finou; Kai xouq (rujxjidxoxx; xovq fjnexepou^ Kai 4>iXiJi7tov Kai xoix;
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formal as the previous King's Peace or the Common Peace of 362 was a
feature of the Peace of Philokrates. The evidence is quite to the contrary.
Nor did Philip accept the Athenian suggestion to broaden the peace. He
obviously preferred to keep his diplomatic relations with other Greek states
separate from those with the Athenians and some of their allies.
Noteworthy, moreover, is that some Athenians now saw both Philip and the
King as threats to Greek Uberty (Dem. 6. 6, 1 1-12).
Immediately pertinent in this connection is yet another embassy to
Athens in 344, this one from the King. The Persian ambassadors were
received at a time when Macedonian envoys were also in the city.
Philochoros, Androtion, and Anaximenes report that the Persian
ambassadors stated that the King considered it appropriate that the peace
and the ancestral friendship between them be maintained.^^ The Athenians
replied stoutly that peace would endure between them unless the King
attacked the Greek cities.^' The arrival of the Persian embassy had
absolutely nothing to do with that of Philip's. Artaxerxes at the time was
engaged in reconquering Phoenicia and Egypt, and obviously wanted to
recruit mercenaries, or, failing that, at least be assured of Athenian
neutrality.^^ Nothing better reflects the complexity of the meaning of the
concept of the common peace in these years than the Athenian response to
these delegations. First, the term koine eirene nowhere appears here,
merely a reference to hereditary friendship. 3' Yet the reference to peace in
the context of the Persian delegation surely refers to previous treaties
between the King and the Greeks. The Athenian allusion to the Greek cities
obviously echoes the terms of the original King's Peace, by which Asia was
Persian and Europe Greek. It simply repeats the Greek sentiments
expressed earlier in the so-called "Reply to the Satraps." In essence, the
Greeks considered a peace to be both de facto and also de jure in effect
among themselves and between themselves and the King so long as he
(Tunndxovi; Towq eKEivow ayeiv ttiv eipfjvTiv, xo-uq 8e nf|6 ' fifietepoxx; omxcuc, (irixe 4>iX{7C7to\)
(runp.dxo\)<; ev ^cacp KCioBai Kal \>no tojv KpeiTtovcov dnoXXvoGai, aXKa xax toutok; 6id
xf)v ujiexepav eipr|vT|v vTtdpxeiv ocoxripiav, Kai tw ovti eiprjVTiv ayeiv Tmaq KaxaGejievovq
xd onKxx. The words xouq dXXouq "EXXTivaq, oaoi \a\ Koivcovoxioi xf\c, eiprjvTi^ prove that the
phrase Koivojvowai xfiq eipfivriq need not, and in this case cannot, refer to a Common Peace.
Rather it means only a specific peace shared by sj)ecific parties. In view of this passage alone,
it is impossible to undersund why Ellis (above, note 3) 146, claims that Philip proposed a
Common Peace, when it was clearly an Athenian initiative.
28 PhQochoros, FGrH 328 F 157; F. Jacoby, FGrH mb (Suppl.) Text (Leiden 1954) 53 1-33;
mb (Suppl.) Noten 426-30; Androtion, FGrH 324 F 53; Anaximenes. FGrH 72 F 28. See also
Diod. 16. 44; M. Sordi, Diodori Siculi Bibliolhecae Liber XVI (Florence 1 969) 8 1-82.
2' E. M. Harris, CP 84 (1989) 36-44, denies that the Athenian response was haughty, yet the
tone is decidedly firm, and reminiscent of the "Reply to the Satraps." Sealey (above, note 1)
172 fails even to address Harris' arguments.
^° M. A. Dandamaev, A Political History of the Achaemenid Empire (Leiden 1989) 309-1 1.
For the date: Isok. 5. 102-03; S. Smith, Babylonian Historical Texts (London 1924) 148.
^' In terms of hereditary friendship, the Argives had earlier done something similar, when
they sent an embassy to Artaxerxes to ask whether the friendship that they had enjoyed with
Xerxes was still in effect: Hdt. 7. 151.
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confined his activity to Asia, Thus, the Greeks remained willing to abide by
their part of the pact made in 386 and later renewed, the failure of the
"Peace of Pelopidas" notwithstanding. Even though a multitude of events
earlier in the fourth century makes the Athenian stance in 344 convenient,
specious, and even sanctimonious, it was nevertheless legally correct.^^
If peace of whatever sort prevailed in Greece in 344, it did not
elsewhere in the eastern Mediterranean. A detailed account of these years
would go well beyond the immediate theme of this piece, and can be found
elsewhere.-'^ Nevertheless, certain specific events pertain alike to the
history of Philip's career, his relations with the King and some of his
subjects, and with the Athenians, as well as to the topic of common peace.
In the following years a single Macedonian pohcy both provoked renewed
hostility with Athens and also brought Philip into conflict with the King.
That policy was Philip's determination to subdue Thrace in order at the very
least to anchor the eastern boundary of his empire on the western shore of
the Hellespont. If successful, Philip would eliminate all Athenian influence
in the northern Aegean, imperil the vital grain route of Athens, and give the
King a powerful and perhaps unwanted neighbor.** War with Athens, its
allies, and perhaps other Greek states was quite likely, and Philip could not
readily foresee how wide such a war would be. Granted that possession of
the Thermopylai corridor gave him a solid defensive position in the south,
and granted that many Greek states felt well disposed towards him, the fact
nonetheless remains that he had not yet secured either their loyalty or their
obedience.^^ Even his settlement in Phokis had its dangers. Although the
Phokians were physically and politically divided and garrisoned by
Macedonians and Thebans, in terms of power the area was a political
vacuum, one that Thebes could fill more quickly, if not permanendy, than
he, as the Theban occupation of Nikaia amply demonstrated.^^ It thus
becomes clear that until Philip had conquered Thrace he could not in any
reasonable strategical terms think either of moving south against Athens and
the rest of Greece or of mounting a major invasion of Persian territory.
^^ Convenient: In 344 the Athenians were in no position to aid anyone. Specious:
Iphikrates had earlier helped the Persians in precisely the same way that Artaxerxes requested
in 344 (Diod. 15. 34). Sanctimonious: The Athenians were forced in 357 to recall Chares
because he was leading rebellious Persian forces (Diod. 16. 21-22), but only after Artaxerxes'
firm complaint. No diplomatic principles were involved in these episodes, only political
expediency.
^3 Wust (above, note 25) 86-140; Ellis (above, note 3) 125-59; Hammond and Griffith
(above, note 3) 11 458-95; H. Bengtson, Philipp and Alexander der Grofie (Munich 1985) 75-
92; Dandamaev (above, note 30) 296-313; S. Ruzicka, Politics ofa Persian Dynasty (Nonman,
OK 1992) 115-21.
^ D. Kienast, Philipp II. von Makedonien und das Reich der Achaimeniden (Munich 1973)
13-15 provides a discussion of Philip's Thracian ambitions and their place in his poUcy
towards Persia.
'^ For the strategic importance of Thermopylai, see Aischin. 2. 132, 138; 3. 140 with schol.;
ps.-Dem. 1 1. 4; W. A. Oldfather. "Nikaia 5," RE XVH (1936) 222-26; Buckler (above, note 3)
92-97.
^^ Philochoros. FGrH 328 F 56b.
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Philip renewed his operations in Thrace in 342 and by the next year he
had dethroned Kersebleptes and sent aid to Kardia in the Chersonesos to
baffle Athenian aspirations there.^'' Despite the vociferous denials of some
Athenian orators, Philip had every right to protect his Kardian allies from
Athenian depredations.^^ Nonetheless, his intervention in the Chersonesos
brought him again in conflict with the Athenians. Moreover, he moved
farther north in the defense of the Greek cities of the Hellespont, where he
was at first welcomed as an ally and protector (Diod. 16. 71. 2). The
Athenians responded by claiming that he had broken the peace, and
Demosthenes urged that embassies be sent to various Greek cities and to the
King to stop any further Macedonian advance.^' According to ps.-
Demosthenes (12. 6-7), the Athenians had actually proposed to send an
embassy to the King seeking a common front against Philip. Whether true
or not, such a delegation, if limited only to a defensive alliance, would not
violate the terms of the Peace of Philokrates.'*^ Nor does ps.-Demosthenes
12 at any time accuse the Athenians of having violated any Common Peace.
These factors make the reference to the King especially pertinent in this
connection. Gone is the image of the King as the traditional enemy of
Greek freedom. Elsewhere as well Demosthenes (10. 52) tells his audience
that the King harbors friendly feelings for all of the Greeks except the
Athenians.'*^ He reminds them that they deserve such treaunent for having
earlier spumed the King's overtures (10. 34), an obvious reference to the
events of 344. To mend this state of affairs he urges them to send an
embassy to the King (10. 33), the latter a reflection of Demosthenes' earlier
policy (9. 71). Ps.-Demosthenes shows no patience with those who caU the
King "the barbarian and the common enemy of the Greeks.'"*^ Although the
Athenians apparently rejected his advice, at least some of them had
obviously come to fear Philip far more than the King. He is ironically
enough depicted as the one best able to protect the common liberty of
the Greeks.
" Kersebleptes: ps.-Dem. 10. 5. 8; Diod. 16. 71. 1-2; Justin 9. 1. Kardia: Dem. 8. 14; 9. 16;
ps.-Dem. 10. 60, 6j; ps.-Dem. 12. 11; see also ps.-Dem. 7. 39-45. The two events arc linked
by ps.-Dem. 10. 15-18 and Dem. 8. 14.
Dem. 5. 25 (see also Diod. 16. 34. 4) in 346 admits that the Athenians had renounced any
claim to Kardia in the Peace of Philokrates, thus leaving them no legal claim to it.
Accordingly, Philip had no reason either to deny or to justify his aid to the city: Dem. 8. 14; 9.
16; ns.-Dem. 12, 1 1; see also ps.-Dem. 7. 39-45.
^^ Dem. 9. 71; the passage referring to these embassies, though lacking in the best mss., is
nonetheless printed by W. Dindorf and F. Blass, Demosthenis Oraliones* (Leipzig 1901) ad
loc.; ps.-Dem. 10. 33.
''° If these accusations be tme, however, they would be still another sign of the increasing
isolation of Athens in Greek politics, and cannot then be taken as typical of the attitude of other
Greek states. Since the Athenians had long been sending embassies to the King (Hdt. 7. 151),
there is nothing implausible about the claim.
"*' For the authenticity of the Fourth Philippic, see A. Korte, RhM 60 (1905) 388-416; C. D.
Adams, CP 33 (1938) 129^4; and now I. V/oT\hinglon, Mnemosyne 44 (1991) 425-28.
*^ Didymos 6. 63-64; Anaximenes, FGrH 72 F 9; see also Jacoby (above, note 28).
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The purported reason for this new community of purpose, insofar as it
can be documented, is that Philip had wronged both the Greeks and the
Persians. In fact, Philip had as yet done nothing of the sort to either. The
only flimsy evidence that Philip harbored at that time any hostile designs
against the King comes from the inconsiderable cases of Artabazos and
Hermeias of Alameus. After the failure of his revolt against Artaxerxes,
Artabazos and his son-in-law Memnon fled to Philip's court."*^ Yet
Artabazos' other son-in-law. Mentor, served so well as satrap of the Asian
coast and overall commander of the Persian forces that he gained pardon for
his kinsmen, who thereafter served the King faithfully.''^ The two Persians
could at most have provided Philip with information drawn from experience
and perhaps with some friendly Persian contacts. Yet they could hardly
have served as useful agents for any designs that Philip may have made on
the King's possessions. Nor had Philip harmed the Greeks during these
years, his attention having been directed primarily against the Thracians."*^
The career of Hermeias of Atameus, for all of its dramatic qualities,
could not have prompted hostility between Philip and the King. Hermeias is
generally depicted as a political adventurer who took advantage of the
turmoil in Asia Minor to turn Atarneus into his own independent
principality and to expand his influence into the Troad. Although ps.-
Demosthenes calls Hermeias Philip's agent, privy to the Macedonian's
plots, he probably played no part in Philip's plans.'*^ There is certainly no
evidence at all of any formal treaty between the two, and absolutely none to
support ps.-Demosthenes' claims about Philip's intentions.'*^ A mere glance
at the map will show that Atameus could never successfully have served as
a bridgehead for a Macedonian invasion of Asia Minor. The political
dimension of this relationship may have been nothing more elaborate than
Philip's desire to remain on friendly terms with Hermeias and his colleagues
in the Troad. Hermeias in turn wanted to remain in good standing with his
new neighbor in Europe, especially should the failure of his ambitions make
it necessary for him to seek asylum. The fate of Hermeias had nothing to do
with Philip. Hermeias had independently, briefly, and ultimately
unsuccessfully set himself against the King, a part of a larger and common
enough pattern in Asia Minor in these years. He paid the price of his failure
with his life. Even his famous refusal to divulge anything to the Persians
*^ Dicxl. 16. 52. 3; Buckler (above, note 3) 53 n. 35, with bibliography.
** Diod. 16. 52. 2; Arr. Anab. 1. 12. 9; A. B. Bosworth, A Historical Commentary on
Arrian's History ofAlexander I (Oxford 1980) 1 12-13.
*^ Diod. 16. 34. 4; Benglson, SdA E^ 308. 318; Wirth (above, note 19) 121-23.
*^ Ps.-Dem. 10. 32 and schol. to 10. 7; Didymos 4. 61-67; 8. 26-32; Theopompos. FGrH
115 F 250; Diod. 16. 52. 5. Although Winh (above, note 19) 118-19 rightly sees an anti-
Persian element in this relationship, Errihgton (above, note 19) 85 is correct in finding no long-
cherished ambitions of Philip in the area. See also Sealey (above, note 1) 183.
^ W. Judeich, Kleinasiatische Studien (Marburg 1892) 298, nonetheless posits a formal
alliance between them.
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about Philip's plans may have resulted more from his lack of anything to
say than from any philosophical principle or political friendship.
Philip did give both the Athenians and the King cause for alarm, when
he attacked Perinthos and Byzantion without clear provocation. The details
are obscure, but the complaints against the two cities are doubtless
specious."** Philip and later Alexander claimed that Perinthos had wronged
Macedonia and that Byzantion had failed to honor its treaty obligations,
when it refused to take up arms against Perinthos. In terms of alliances,
Byzantion had seceded from the Second Athenian Confederacy, and
Perinthos had apparently followed its lead.'*' Hence, they were bound
neither by the agreements that had created the Athenian sea-league nor had
they participated in the Peace of Philokrates. Byzantion had in the
meantime agreed to an alliance with Philip that it interpreted as purely
defensive in nature.^^ The Byzantines clearly did not believe that Perinthos
was the aggressor, and accordingly refused to answer Philip's call to arms.
Lastly, since Artaxerxes had never renounced his right to do what he
considered "just," he could consider it proper for him to intervene against
Philip to defend the "autonomy of Greek states small and great." Thus, in
this incident at least two different treaties could be invoked, with each party
interpreting the situation in the way that it wished.
Philip's attacks on Perinthos and Byzantion drew Athens and the King,
albeit independently, closer to a common goal of thwarting Philip's
ambitions in the area. At least one Athenian orator (ps.-Dem. 11. 6) even
hoped that the King would become the paymaster of the Athenians in the
effort to repel Philip. Although the King had never since the original
King's Peace attempted directly to enforce his will militarily in Greece, he
was now in a situation in which he could do so with very slight risk. He
intervened so effectively that the orator (ps.-Dem. 11. 5) averred that the
mercenary soldiers of the satraps of Asia Minor had compelled Philip to
raise the siege of Perinthos.^^ Support for his claim comes from a variety of
sources, some of them contemporary. Theopompos (FGrH 115 F 222)
reports that one Aristodemos of Pherai, who later commanded Greek
mercenaries against Alexander the Great, had also served with the generals
of the King against Philip. Anaximenes {FGrH 72 F 1 lb.5) also testifies to
mercenaries in the pay of the King operating against Philip in defense of
Perinthos. Diodoros (16. 75. 1-2) states that the King ordered his satraps on
the coast to assist Perinthos with mercenaries, funds, food, and material.
One of the mercenary commanders was Apollodoros of Athens, who was
*** In the Letter of Philip (ps.-Dem. 12) no mention of Perinthos is made, even though the
matter figures prominently in the Answer to Philip's Letter (ps.-Dem. 1 1. 3, 5); Dem. 18. 87;
ps.-Dem. 12. 2; Diod. 16. 74. 2; Arr. Anab. 2. 14. 5; Justin 9. 1. 2-5.
"' Plut. Dem. 17. 2; J. Cargill. The Second Athenian Uague (Berkeley 1981) 181.
50 Benguon. 5^4 0^318.
5' PhUochoros. FGrH 328 T 54; Diod. 16. 75. 1.
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dispatched by Aristes, the satrap of Phrygia.^^ p^ important aspect of this
incident is that whatever the Greeks might make of the concept of the
Common Peace, Artaxerxes still thought in terms of his original King's
Peace. If he acted in 340 and not earlier, it was because these events
provided him with a unique situation. He had never before enjoyed such a
favorable opportunity directly to use military might to enforce his will in
Greece without at the same time alarming the Greeks.^^ Moreover, there
was no one to stop him, and the scene of action was far removed from the
mainstream of Greek politics. He could even justifiably argue, although
there is no evidence that he did, that he protected Greek freedom from
Macedonian aggression.
Sometimes associated with these events is the alleged treaty of alliance
and friendship between Philip and the King, which surfaces in a very
suspicious context.^'* According to Arrian (Anab. 2. 14. 2), after the battle
of Issos, Dareios sent Alexander a letter in which, among other things, he
mentioned such a treaty. He also claimed that when Arses, son of
Artaxerxes, became King, Philip first wronged him. The letter also
observes that Alexander had sent no envoy to the King to confirm their
ancient friendship and alliance. The events of 340 argue forcibly that the
letter cannot be authentic. Nevertheless, even should one wish to accept it,
it is obvious that the situation compelled Dareios to be as conciliatory and
as aggrieved as possible. Alexander had just defeated him in pitched battle,
Egypt was in the Macedonian's grasp, and even as Alexander read the letter
he had the King's wife, children, and mother in his power. Dareios had
every reason to bend the truth and to fabricate generalities of past amicable
Persian and Macedonian relations. Furthermore, in his purported reply
Alexander never acknowledges the existence of this treaty, much less does
he defend his conduct by accusing the Persians of having been the first to
violate it. Instead, he retails the various wrongs that the Persians had done
the Macedonians and Greeks, a defense of Philip's publicly proclaimed
reason for having invaded Persian territory in the first place. Alexander's
letter provides no evidence whatsoever that the Macedonian was even aware
of a treaty, which, even had it existed, would have had nothing to do either
with the King's Peace or the Common Peace.
In his letter Alexander is himself guilty of trying to falsify history. He
claims that Ochos at some unspecified time had sent a force into Thrace,
then under Macedonian rule (Arr. Anab. 2. 14. 5). Yet it is virtually
*^ Paus. 1. 29. 10, on which see J. G. Frazer, Pausanias's Description ofGreece R (London
1898) 382-83; Strabo 16. 3. 5.
^^ Phamabazos' use of Konon during the Corinthian War is somewhat analogous: P. Funke,
Homonoia undArche, Historia Einzelschr. 37 (Wiesbaden 1980) 81-85.
^ Bengtson, SdA 11^ 333; Boswoith (above, note 44) I 228-33, with earlier bibliography.
Winh (above, note 19) 115 associates the treaty with the King's Egyptian campaign. Neither
R. Bernhardt, Chiron 18 (1988) 181-98 nor Sealey (above, note 1) 308 n. 40 can prove a
formal alliance.
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impossible to substantiate the accusation. Theopompos mentions that Philip
launched an attack on a Thracian tribe, the Tetrachoritai, also identified with
the Bessoi, and the city of Agessos, to which Polyainos (4. 4. 1) adds that
Antipatros played a prominent part in the operations.^^ Some have put this
incident in 340.^^ Yet even without questioning the authenticity of a
Macedonian campaign in this area, one cannot link the Persians to it.
Geography alone is against any alleged Persian intervention in northern
Thrace in this or, for that matter, any other time. Moreover, there is no
comprehensible way that a Persian expedition to assist the Bessoi could be
strategically significant to an effort to bring relief to Perinthos and
Byzantion, even as a diversionary tactic. For the Persian-paid forces the
distances were too great, the lines of supply too long, and the invading army
too vulnerable to the danger of being cut off from its base. If Alexander's
complaint has any validity at all, which is extremely doubtful, he must have
referred to the actions around Perinthos. If so, he was doing nothing more
than gilding the lily, and so that particular claim should not be taken as a
separate grievance. Perhaps the important aspect of his allegation, despite
its meretricious nature, is that it brings the point of friction between Philip
and the King once again to Thrace. The soundest conclusion of all,
however, is that the entire matter of a Persian-Macedonian alliance as
related by Arrian is an ancient fabrication.
The only other piece of evidence available also supports the view that
Philip had no official ties with Persia. Plutarch reports a Persian embassy to
Philip that cannot be dated. ^^ Philip himself was absent at the time, and
obviously nothing came of the matter. It need not be doubted that Philip
maintained contact with the satraps in Asia Minor and also with the King,
but that hardly constitutes a treaty.^* Nor have historians found an
appropriate and convincing place in Philip's career for such a treaty. The
only contemporary evidence to bear upon the matter comes from
Demosthenes (4. 48). In 351 he claimed that some Athenians had spread
the rumor that Philip had sent an embassy to the King, and immediately
added (4. 49) that these rumor-mongers were a pack of fools. The important
point in this connection is that the only contemporary witness, who was
certainly no friend of Philip, displays no knowledge of any treaty between
Philip and the King. Therefore, there is no need to postulate one.
Enough remains, however, to prove Philip's distinct interest in Asian
affairs but nothing more. Even his response to the King's intervention in
5^ Theopompos. FGrH 115 F 217-18; Hdt. 7. 3. 2; Livy 44. 7; Slqjh. Byz. s.v. Telrachoriiai;
E. Oberhummer, "Bessoi," RE YR (1897) 329-31; W. W. How and J. Wells. A Commentary on
Herodotus II (Oxford 1912) 168.
56 Beloch. GG Uf.l 548-51; Bosworth (above, note 44) 231.
5''
Alex. 5. 1; Mor. 342b; J. R. Hamilton. Plutarch. Alexander: A Commentary (Oxford 1969)
13.
5* A. Momigliano. Filippo il Macedone (Rorence 1934) 139 n. 1; Wust (above, note 25) 89;
Wirth (above, note 19) 148.
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the Perinthian affair was defensive in nature. His new advances in Thrace
gave Philip additional reason to seek friendly relations with his immediate
Asian neighbors, as the incident with Pixodaros proves.^' Pixodaros of
Karia made overtures to Philip, seeking a marriage alliance. Philip treated
the matter with his usual caution. Nothing came immediately of the contact,
although Alexander would later reap the harvest of friendly relations
between Macedonia and Karia. Nevertheless, this otherwise insignificant
incident demonstrates both Philip's interest in Asia Minor and the
realization of dynasts there that Phihp could be a potential friend against
the King. Yet nothing could be done in Asia until Philip had settled
Greek affairs.
In Greece meanwhile the Athenians declared war on Philip in 340.^^
The Macedonian victory over the Athenians and Thebans at Chaironeia in
338 ended the period of open warfare. Victory also gave Philip the
opportunity to secure the obedience of the other Greek states. He first made
peace with his two opponents and their allies.^' He next entered the
Peloponnesos, where he settled a number of territorial disputes.^^ Having
done so, he announced his intention to wage a war of revenge against
Persia, and summoned the Greeks to a congress at Corinth. ^^ Philip's
conduct can be put into a traditional context. It was by no means unusual
for Greeks to settle their differences and to choose a hegemon before
embarking upon a war. Some had done so before Xerxes' invasion.
Afterwards, without a formal peace having been concluded, some Greeks
joined with Athens to establish the Delian Confederacy.^'* In the fourth
century the Athenians called upon the Greeks to form a coalition under the
hegemony of Athens to maintain the existing King's Peace. Similarly, in
378 Agesilaos had ordered Sparta's allies to suspend their various hostilities
before his invasion of Boiotia (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 37). With the exception of
the creation of the Delian Confederacy, in which peace was not a factor, the
other examples display similarities. First, there is the concept of a generally
perceived external threat; next, the necessity for Greeks to pool their
resources against it; and lastly agreement among them on a leader that
commanded overall respect. Those assembled at Corinth in 337 concluded
59 Plut. Alex. 10. 1-3; Hamilton (above, note 57) 25-26. Arr. Anab. 1. 23. 7; Bosworth
(above, note 44) I 152-53. Wirth (above, note 19) 151-52 rightly points out that Halikamassos
was too far removed to serve as a bridgehead for a Macedonian invasion of Asia.
^ Ellis (above, note 3) 179-80, with full references at 288, correctly interprets Philip's
seizure of the grain fleet as the last straw. Nevertheless, the Athenians are hardly innocent of
blame for the deterioraUon of relations, if only because they had earlier and needlessly
antagonized Philip in the Chersonesos: ps.-Dem. 12. 23; Dem. 8. 2; ps.-Dem. 9. 20, 23; schol.
Dem. 10. 1 et passim.
^1 H. H. Schmitt, Die Staalsvertrdge des Allerlums HI (Munich 1969) 403.
" Polybios 9. 33. 7-12; 18. 14; AeUan, VH 6. \\ F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary
on Polybius U (Oxford 1967) 172-73.
" Diod. 18. 89. 1-2; FGrH 255. 5; Justin 9. 5. 5, 8.
^ Bengtson, SdA 11^ 130, 132, 257.
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an alliance and elected Philip both hegemon and strategos autokrator of it.
Philip immediately set quotas of soldiers and supplies to be contributed by
the cities for the campaign against the King.
These conclusions lead to the question of whether Philip's settlement
was considered a Common Peace. The answer, unfortunately, is not as
simple as the question. Contemporary literary sources do not use the term
until 330 (see below) and only two later secondary sources, Plutarch and
Justin, apply it to this treaty. Plutarch {Phok. 16. 5) states that Demades
introduced a bill enjoining the Athenians to participate in the common peace
and the synhedrion of the Greeks (ti noXic, \xzxixo\ xfiq koivti<; eiprivTiq Kal
Tou a\)V£5pio\) Toiq "EXh\o\v), which he could perhaps have found in
Krateros' collection of Athenian decrees.^^ Justin's testimony is far less
important, for in his eyes any large meeting of the Greeks could be seen as
universal or common, and any state of peace that ensued would also
therefore be general or common (9. 5. 2). Thus, he had earlier referred (8.
1. 4) to the Amphiktyonic Council as the "common council of Greece,"
which it decidedly was not.*^ In fact, most contemporaries do not use the
phrase koine eirene in connection with the "Charter of the League of
Corinth." Demosthenes (18. 201) speaks of Philip as lord of all Greece, and
Aischines (3. 132) refers to the Macedonian hegemony of Greece against
the Persians. Polybios (9. 33. 7) saw Philip as such a benefactor of Greece
that he was given hegemony on land and sea. He further observed (9. 33.
11-12) that Philip forced the Greeks to settle their differences in a common
body.^'^ Even Diodoros (16. 89. 1-5), who has at least once manufactured a
Common Peace for posterity, the "Peace of Pelopidas," never applies the
term to the settlement of 337.^* In brief, he states that after Chaironeia
Philip wanted to be the hegemon of all Greece. In order to discuss with the
Greeks matters of individual and general concern, he convened a common
congress (koinon synhedrion) at Corinth, at which he was elected strategos
autokrator. Both Plutarch (Mor. 240a-b) and the Oxyrhynchos Chronicle
{FGrH 255, 5) record the creation of a common congress and the election of
Philip as hegemon and strategos autokrator, but nowhere is peace
mentioned.
Despite this body of testimony, there is ample reason to conclude that
Philip's settlement indeed included a defacto and dejure Common Peace as
part of his settlement of Greek affairs. Likewise, common or general peace
in Greece now certainly has become a well-understood notion without.
^^ W. C. Helmbold and E. N. O'Neil. Plutarch's Quotations (Baltimore 1959) 20 s.v.
Craterus, and for Plutarch's use of inscriptions: J. Buckler, ANRW 11.33.6 (Berlin and New
York 1992)4794-99.
^ Roux (above, note 10) 1-59.
^^ Walbank (above, note 62) H 171-73.
^ Ryder (above, note 3) 137-39; Buckler (above, note 15) 198-201.
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however, koine eirene having become a technical term.*' The best
monument to the complexity of Philip's settlement and the most important
is the contemporary inscription often referred to as the "Charter of the
League of Corinth."^^ Here one finds peace. The question becomes, "Of
what sort?" The answer is complicated by the fact that most of the left-hand
side of the inscription and some of the right are lost. Hence, resort must be
made to restoration. Yet with so much of the original wording gone,
virtually any restoration amounts to speculation. It is moreover unsound
method to base a historical interpretation on one restoration, especially
when others are equally possible.^' For example, M. N. Tod prints the
following text of lines 3-5 of the inscription:
[v "ApTj 0£O'U(; Tcdvxac; Kai 7idcya]c- £|i.|i.£vS [ev xf)]
[i eipTivTii, Km o\) Xvoto xaq a]\)v6T|Ka(; xd[(; Tip]
[65 OiX-iJiTiov MaKE56va, ov)5]£ onKa eKo([o(o e]
The stoichedon-count of the inscription is 33 but with irregularities. The
extant parts of these lines read
[..
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concerning Alexander's restoration of the Chian exiles.''^ Raue, however,
posits [xiaiq onovSalc, £)I)j.ev6vt](ov.
Lines 19-20 have the most direct bearing on the question of a Common
Peace in 338/7. Schmitt is quite alive to the difficulties involved, when he
prints [ol dSiKcu^evoi (?)] jcal noXz\n\0(0 xGi\[i Tqv Koiv-qv eiprivTiv (?)
TiaplapaivovTi, If correct, this restoration would constitute only the second
fourth-century epigraphical appearance of the phrase koine eirene. Three
other equally suitable restorations have also been proposed, none of them
involving the word eirene. Schwahn suggested instead Tcbl[i Totq Koiva<;
a\)v0riKa<;] , with line 4 as support,"^^ Schehl xGi\[i xdabz laq oMvQi\Ka(;],
with lines 15-16 as support,^'* and Raue xa)l[i xouaSe xovq opKovq],
unsupported by anything on the stone.^^ Lastly, Heisserer prints koine
eirene without commentJ^
Only in line 14 is there an unequivocal reference to a sworn peace:
x\[ox>c, opKo-oc, xox>q nepi XT\]q eiprivTiq w^vuov. It is instructive that eirene
cannot be modified by koine because of the stoichedon-count. The
imperfect of the verb adds its own complications. Regarding the exchange
of these oaths, it is impossible "to distinguish between the progress of an
action and its mere occurrence"^^ or as an act or process not yet completed.
It is conceivable, but not demonstrable, that the process of formally
concluding the peace had not been completed when the delegates met at
Corinth. For example, the Spartans stubbornly refused to participate in
these affairs.''* The epigraphical debut of the term may help to solve the
problem. In Bengtson, SdA IP 292 one reads in lines 2 and 5 of a koine
eirene. Thereafter the noun is without any modifier but the article. At the
beginning of this document, the Greeks were determined to emphasize the
common nature of the peace among them and their desire to remain at peace
with the King, so long as he refrained from interfering in Greek affairs.
One does not find the same usage in line 14 of SdA III 403, the first time in
the inscription when peace is undeniably mentioned. The absence of the
phrase koine eirene in this context proves that it was not a technical term.
As in 362 many Greeks and now the Macedonians had concluded peace
without including the King. In fact, Philip had done precisely what the
Athenians had urged in 344. The greater number of states involved made
Philip's settlement even a more extensive and general peace than that
concluded after Mantineia in 362. Because peace preceded the formal
'^ For a new edition of Schmitt, SdA III 403, see A. J. Heisserer, Alexander the Great and
the Greeks (Norman, OK 1980) 9.
''3A'//o,Beih. 21 (1930)2.37.
'"dy/z 27 (1932) 115^5.
'^ H. O. Raue, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des korinthischen Bundes (diss. Marburg
1937)5-6.72-74.
'^ Heisserer (above, note 72).
" W. W. Goodwin and G. B. Gulick, Greek Grammar (Boston 1958) 1261b.
'*
Plut. Mor. 240a-b; Arr. Anab. 1.1. 1-2; 1. 16. 7; C. Roebuck, CP 43 (1948) 84-89; M.
Qauss, Sparta (Munich 1983) 75.
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congress at Corinth, at least in most cases, it could reasonably be called a
common peace in a way that would generally be understood in Greece.
If the inscription recording Philip's settlement with the Greeks says
nothing about a koine eirene, the phrase is likewise conspicuously absent
elsewhere in contemporary Greek inscriptions, except in restorations that
admit of other possibilities. The closest analogies come from Tod, GHI II
183 (= Schmitt, SdA III 403.11), lines 10-11, which is Alexander's renewal
of Philip's treaty. Wilhelm, Tod, and Schmitt refuse restoration. Yet A. J.
Heisserer in a masterful restoration prints [aXXct ajiaoai al Kowtovovoai
rnq EipT|VTi]q, which is reminiscent of Tod, GHI II 192, lines 12-13: aoxoi)^
E^ ocTiaacov xoiv noXecov tcov Tfjq £ipTivTi(; Koivcovovlawv.'^' Heisserer was
the first to observe the four-bar sigma at the beginning of line 1 1 , yet he also
notes that in line 11a sigma and a tau occupy the same stoichos, which
suggests that similar irregularities are possible elsewhere on the stone, thus
making certain restoration ultimately impossible.^^ One will also seek the
phrase in vain in the longer inscription printed by Schmitt {SdA 111 446, the
treaty between Antigonos and Demetrios and the Greeks). Although peace
is mentioned several times (lines 22, 67, 72), it is never modified by koine,
whereas war is (6 Koivoq KoXefioq, fines 71, 77, 91). In these diplomatic
contexts, koine and koinos are obviously as exclusive as they are
inclusive.*'
The problem of the nature of Philip's settlement is further complicated
by still another technicality. There has long been a dispute as to whether the
"Charter" is one of a Common Peace or only of alliance. Among recent
scholars T. T. B. Ryder and S. Perlman claim that it is a Common Peace,
largely on the basis of ps.-Demosthenes 17, but J. A. O. Larsen and A. J.
Heisserer argue that the document is an instrument of alliance.*^ The very
clauses of the inscription support the position of Larsen and Heisserer. The
first of them, lines 4-7, concerns non-aggression among those who had
sworn the oaths sealing the agreement. A similar clause appears earlier in
Bengtson, SdA IP 280, lines 23-30, an alliance between Athens and
Dionysios I of Syracuse, in which both parties agree not to attack each
other. This stipulation is also found in the Peace of Nikias (Bengtson, SdA
IP 188), which alone suggests that things may not be as clear-cut as one
would like. Lines 12-13 require that no state overthrow a constitution then
'' Heisserer (above, note 72) 4, 9, 80.
*° Heisserer (above, note 72) 81-95, where Heisserer remarks that "the lettering is
undistinguished."
*^ Compare Bengtson, SdA 11^ 262, lines 21-22, referring to members of the Second
Athenian Confederacy, as opposed to those outside it; Tod, GHI 11 137, line 16, a reference to
the common practices of the Greeks; and note 27 above.
*^ Ryder (above, note 3) 150-62; Perlman (above, note 69); Larsen, CP 20 (1925) 316-17;
34 (1939) 378. Larsen's theory that the alliance excludes the peace is contradicted by line 14
of the inscription. See also Heisserer (above, note 72) 8-20; A. B. Bosworth, Historia 20
(1971) 610-13; J. Seibert, Alexander der Grofle (Damistadt 1981) 74-77; N. G. L. Hammond
and F. W. Walbank, A History ofMacedonia IE (Oxford 1988) 571-79.
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in existence of a member state. This clause was very common in treaties
among Athens and its allies.^^ One finds a version of it in the "Charter of
the Second Athenian Confederacy," where each ally has the right to live
under whatever constitution it wants (Bengtson, SdA IP 257, lines 10-12).
This right is repeated in a treaty between Athens and Chalkis (Bengtson,
SdA IP 259, lines 21-26) and in the alliance between Athens and Dionysios
(above, lines 23-30). Lines 15-19 of SdA III 403 pledge to provide mutual
assistance to any of the parties that had been wronged or attacked. This
clause is standard in alliances, as can be seen from a host of inscriptions.
The reference to peace, such as that found in line 14 of SdA III 403, is also
common, parallels being IG IP 34, 35, and 103. Finally, a fragment of SdA
III 403 gives a partial hst of the participants of the agreement, which again
has an epigraphical precedent in Bengtson, SdA ]P 257.
Although the word "alliance" never appears in this document, even in a
restoration, the fact of alliance is proven by the clear reference to the
hegemon of the signatories in lines 21-22. A peace treaty did not have a
hegemon, as witnessed by the Peace of Nikias (Thuc. 5. 18). The reference
in lines 13-14 to a peace that was already considered sealed or in the
process of being sealed strengthens the conclusion that peace and alliance
were two separate parts of the same settlement, and that SdA III 403 dealt
only with alliance. In fact, the "Charter of the League of Corinth" most
closely resembles that of the Second Athenian Confederacy, which was also
made within the framework of an existing peace.
Two other fourth-century sources later support the conclusion that
Philip's settlement, taken as a whole, was considered a Common Peace.
The first is the Athenian orator known only as ps.-Demosthenes (17, On the
Treaty with Alexander). In his speech, which is normally dated to 331, he
repeatedly refers to a Common Peace with Alexander, and accuses him of
several violations of it.^'' One serious difficulty with the use of ps.-
Demosthenes in connection with the events of 337 is the question of
whether Alexander's arrangements were a simple renewal of Philip's pact
or something new. Alexander, as had Philip before him, made some
adjustments to the situation in Greece, especially in the Peloponnesos.*^
Other literary sources maintain that upon Philip's death Alexander
immediately demanded that the Greeks recognize him as hegemon, and that
*' Bengtson, SdA 11^ 290, lines 24-34, an alliance among Athens. Arkadia, Achaia, EUs, and
Phleious, which guarantees the existing constitutions of the participants.
*^ Common Peace: 1. 2, 4, 16-17; violations: 4, 8, 10, etc.; G. L. Cawkwell, Phoenix 15
(1961) 74-78. Heisserer (above, note 72) xxvii, is quite right to note that no modem,
systematic examination of this speech is available.
*^ Polybios 18. 14. 6-13. on which see Walbank (above, note 62) II 568-70. On this
problem, Schmitt, SdA HI 403 (p. 14) provides an extensive earlier bibliography, and Seiben
(above, note 82) 74-76 an excellent discussion of the problem. My thanks to Professor Dr.
Ralf Urban, who is in no way respxjnsible for my conclusions, for his letter of 19 March 1990,
with his helpful comments on this topic.
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he assumed all of his father's other rights.^ All of the evidence indicates
that Alexander simply renewed Philip's settlement, and that he made his
decisions regarding Peloponnesian affairs under its aegis. Furthermore,
Alexander doubtless lacked the time, inclination, and the need radically to
recast Philip's treaty. The second contemporary source is Aischines (3.
254), who in 330, immediately before the celebration of the Pythian Games
and the meeting of the synhedrion of the Greeks, spoke against any
Athenian decision to honor Demosthenes. Aischines' ostensible reason is
that such a gesture would make it appear that the Athenians were
sympathetic with those who violate the Common Peace. Hence, these two
Athenian sources link the concepts of the Common Peace, the synhedrion of
the Greeks, and the hegemon of an alliance with Macedonia.
Another episode, though not from a contemporary source, is singularly
pertinent to this topic. Diodoros reports an incident that occurred in 335
during Alexander's siege of Thebes.*^ Before launching his assault on the
city, Alexander sent a herald to invite the Thebans "to share in the peace
that was common to the Greeks" (Kai ^exexEiv xfiq Koivfiq loic, "EX,A,iiaiv
eipTivTiq). The Thebans responded that anyone who wished to free the
Greeks from tyranny should rather join them and the King. Although the
Theban retort could conceivably refer to the abortive "Peace of Pelopidas"
or more probably to the original King's Peace and its renewals, it is
preferable to understand it as a denouncement of the state of peace in which
the king of Macedonia had not only assumed the role of the King in Greek
affairs but had also become the guarantor of the Common Peace.
Significant also is that peace with the King is contrasted with a Common
Peace shared by Greeks and Macedonians.^^
The evidence, taken as a whole, presents a reasonably clear picture of
the settlement in 338/7. In effect, Philip did several things in quick
succession. He brought about a state of peace among the Greeks in which
the King had played no part. Next, he established a broad Greek alliance of
which the King was not a member. Philip thus excluded the King from
Greek affairs, and freed the concept of a general Greek peace from the
notion of the King's control. Lastly, he intended to use this situation against
the King. The peace was only a component, albeit an important one, of
Philip's policy towards the Greeks and Persians. Hegemony was the
*^ Diod. 17. 3. 1-2. 4. 9; Plul. Alex. 14. 1; Arr. Anab. 1. 1. 1-2.
^ Diod. 17. 9. 5; see also Plut. Alex. 11.8.
** As hegemon of the League of Corinth, Alexander had the right and the duty to maintain
the peace and alliance that Philip had established. It was also utterly necessary for him to
assert his position in the face of the first serious opposition to it. Yet more was involved than
mere propaganda or rationalization. By invoking the Common Peace, Alexander issued a
singular ultimatum to the Thebans, as well as a practical way in which to end the rebellion. If
the Thebans surrendered and honored the Common Peace, they would return to the fold of the
Greeks. If not, they would betray the Greeks, just as their forebears had done during the
invasion of Xerxes, this at a time when Alexander was preparing to take his father's war of
revenge into Asia itself.
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essential element in Philip's plans, peace a means to make them possible of
fulfillment, and war against Persia a traditional Greek way to bring them to
completion.
The novel component of Philip's policy was to use the concept of
general peace in Greece for ends certainly not envisaged in 386 and later.
Both in 362 and again in 344 Greeks had said that they were at peace with
the King, and thus would not take military or naval action against him so
long as he honored the peace. Yet for Philip peace in Greece formed the
foundation for a war to avenge the depredations of Xerxes, a grievance that
had nothing to do with the conditions that had led to the original King's
Peace. Since during the fourth century the King had not harmed the Greeks
to any significant degree, a casus belli not covered by the King's original
edict must be found to justify Philip's planned attack on Asia. For that
purpose Xerxes' invasion served his needs well enough.
Once he had made peace and alliance with the Greeks, Philip turned his
attention to the King, so it remains to ask what his intentions were in
this area.
It may be . . . that [he] never had a blue-print of expansion and conquest,
complete with dates, but instead often responded opportunistically to
crises brought about by the drift of events or the actions of others.
That is actually the opinion of A. J. P. Taylor of the ambitions of Adolf
Hitler, but the evaluation seems far more appropriate to Philip.^' If Philip
ever had a "master-plan," he never revealed it to anyone who subsequently
repeated it, nor lived long enough to implement it. Hostile sources hinder
understanding and baffle speculation. Nothing of the extant evidence
suggests that he had had any ambitions in Asia until the King interfered
with his Thracian operations, specifically the King's aid to Perinthos.
Philip's Asian contacts further suggest that the Macedonian's ambitions
were limited to the coast and to the environs of Asia Minor. The available
evidence points to one reasonable conclusion. All of Philip's known
contacts with the King's subjects and his rebels were with those in the
immediate vicinity of the expanded Macedonian kingdom. As hegemon of
the Greeks, he pursued a traditional Greek policy, one limited to the Aegean
basin. There is absolutely no reason to think that he ever seriously looked
beyond the Ionian coast. Seen in this light, one can justifiably conclude that
Philip used the concepts of hegemony and peace in Greece to pursue a
traditional and limited policy against the Persians. There is nothing to
*' Taylor, quoted in C. Bamett, Hitler's Generals (New York 1989) 5. Nevertheless, Ellis
(above, note 3) 175 refers to Philip's "time-table," a view quite common in the United States as
early as the Colonial Period: Madison in J. E. Cooke (ed.). The Federalist (Middletown, CT
1961) 113; F. Ames in C. S. Hyneman and D. S. Lutz, American Political Writing during the
Founding Era H andianapoUs 1983) 1306.
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suggest that he, like his son, ever seriously planned to conquer the entire
Persian Empire.'^
Appendix: King's Peace and Koine Eirene
The term koine eirene is as remarkably absent from extant fourth-century
sources as it is prominent in Diodoros' later account of Greek affairs. The
most useful approach to the problem is perhaps to compare Diodoros'
interpretations of the treaties with the evidence of the fourth century. By
casting Diodoros' testimony in schematic form, one sees the following:
1. 14. 1 10. 3; 15. 5. 1 (387/6): The Greek cities of Asia are subject to the
King, but all other Greeks shall be autonomous. Those refusing to
accept these terms suffer war at the hands of the King and those who
support him. The Greeks enjoy the koine eirene of Antalkidas.
2. 15. 38. 1 (375): The King sent ambassadors to Greece to conclude a
koine eirene.
3. 15. 42. 2 (374): The Greeks no longer honor the koine eirene that had
been made. Greek cities should be autonomous and free.
4. 15. 50. 4 (372/1): The King sent ambassadors to renew a koine eirene
in accordance with former agreements.
5. 15. 51. 1 (371/0): Thebes not a participant in the koine eirene of 15.
50.4.
6. 15. 70. 2 (369/8): Artaxerxes sent Philiskos to Greece to establish a
koine eirene.
I. 15. 76. 3 (366/5): The King sent envoys to Greece to make a koine
eirene.
8. 15. 89. 1 (362/1): After the battle of Mantineia the Greeks met to
conclude a koine eirene and symmachia.
9. 15. 90. 2 (362): The Spartans were estranged from Artaxerxes because
he had included the Messenians in the koine eirene on the same terms
as the other Greeks.
10. 15. 94, 1 (362): Reference to koine eirene after Mantineia, obviously
referring to 15. 89. 1,90.2.
II. 16. 60. 3 (346): The Amphiktyons established a koine eirene and
homonoia among the Greeks.
12. 20. 46. 6 (307): Demetrios called upon the Rhodians to engage in war,
but they refused to break the koine eirene.
5° For Philip's ambitions, see S. Ruzicka. AJAH 10 (1985 [1992]) 84-91. whom I gladly
thank for his kindness in having shared an earlier draft of his paper with me. The question is
an old one: E. Badian in W. M. Calderm and A. Demandt (eds.). Eduard Meyer (Leiden 1990)
18-19. Perhaps the most nihilistic view ever presented comes from G. Clemenceau,
Demosthenes, Eng. trans. (Boston 1926) 14-15, who claims that Philip waged his war against
Persia "for ends that he never took the trouble to determine."
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It is immediately obvious that in Diodoros' mind the meaning of koine
eirene has not changed from his first use of it in 14. 1 10. 3 to his last in 20.
46. 6. Although by Demetrios' day there was no longer a Great King or a
political system in Greece quite like that obtaining before Philip's victory at
Chaironeia, Diodoros could nonetheless write of a koine eirene throughout
the period, as though nothing at all had changed. The precise details of
these various agreements differed, but Diodoros was indifferent to them.
The very concept of a Common Peace as a technical term is probably
Diodoros' own creation, perhaps the result of his acceptance of Stoic ideas
of universality, which range from the deity bringing nature into koivtiv
dvaA^oyiav (1. 1. 3), the commonality of life (xov koivov p{ov 1. 1. 1,2. 1),
common affairs (1. 1. 3), and benefactors for the common good (27. 18.
2).^^ Diodoros may very well have seen these fourth-century treaties in this
very same light
—
pacts made for the common tranquility of mankind.
Whatever the interpretation of Diodoros' thought, fourth-century
evidence tells a dramatically different story, one that can again be told most
conveniently schematically in terms of nomenclature, participants, and
treaty obligations:
1. The Peace of 386 {SdA IP 242) is called the Peace of Antalkidas (Xen.
Hell. 5. 1. 36; Plut. Artox. 21.5) and the peace that the King sent down
(Xen. Hell. 5. 1. 32, 35-36). It may also have been called a koine
eirene, if the restoration of hne 13 of SdA W} 257 be accepted. Basileus
(line 14) is preserved, as is part of syn[thekas]. The treaty put an end to
the Corinthian War (Xen. Hell. 5. 1. 35; 5. 3. 27; see also Plut. Ages.
23. 1-5). All states, with some specific exceptions, were to be
autonomous, whether or not they had been belligerents (Xen. Hell. 5. 1.
31; Plut. Artox. 21. 5-6; Ages. 23. 1).
2. The Peace of 375 (SdA IP 265): It is called a King's Peace
(Philochoros, FGrH 328 F 151). The participants included the King
(Dem. 19. 253), Sparta, Athens, Thebes, Amyntas of Macedonia, and
most of the Greeks (Xen. Hell. 6. 2. 1; Isok. 15. 109-10; Aischin. 2. 32;
Dem. 3. 16; 19. 253; Nepos, Tim. 2. 2). All cities were to be free of
garrisons and autonomous (Isok. 14. 10).
3. First Peace of 371 (SdA IP 269): Xen. Hell. 6. 3. 18 mentions only
eirene. The participants included the King, Sparta, Athens, and their
allies. Thebes abstained. Terms called for general disarmament, and
autonomy for all Greek states (Xen. Hell. 6. 3. 12).
4. Second Peace of 371 (SdA IP 270): This treaty was called a King's
Peace (IG IP 103, line 24). Although Athens, Sparta, and their allies
attended (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 1, 3), Thebes presumably remained aloof.
The terms were the same as those that the King had earlier sent down
'^ For an excellent study of this aspect of Diodoros' thinking, see K. S. Sacks, Diodorus
Siculus and the First Century (Princeton 1990) 23-54, which supplants Ryder (above, note 3)
xiv-xv.
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(Xen, Hell. 6. 5. 1-3). Included was an enabling clause whereby
participants swore to take the field against anyone breaking the peace.
5. So-called Peace of Pelopidas {SdA IP 282): Xen. Hell 7. 1 . 39 refers to
this pact between those Greeks who wanted to be friends of the King
and the Thebans. Participation by the King is well attested, as is that of
other Greeks (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 36; PluL Pel. 30; Artox. 22). Stipulations
called for a recognition of Messenian independence, a disarmament
clause aimed at the Athenian fleet, and an enabling clause that bound
participants to enforce the peace militarily, if necessary.
6. Peace of 362 {SdA IP 292): The first treaty unequivocally to be called a
koine eirene in contemporary inscriptions, it is also described as
spondai (Polyb. 4. 33. 8) and eirene among the Greeks (Plut. Ages. 35.
3). Neither the King nor the Spartans were participants (Polyb. 4. 33.
8-9). The terms embraced general peace and alliance. The terms
declared that since the Greeks had concluded a general peace, they had
no quarrel with the King, who had not harmed them.
7. Peace of Philokrates {SdA IP 329): Given its name by contemporaries
(Aischin. 3. 54; Dem. 19; see also Dion. Hal. Epist. ad Ammaeum 1.
1 1). The treaty was one of peace and alliance between Philip and his
allies and Athens and its maritime confederacy. The King did not
participate, nor did Phokis or Kersebleptes (Dem. 19. 49). Aischines
(2. 57-61; 3. 58) urged that other Greeks be allowed to participate. The
terms recognized the principle of holding what one possessed (Dem.
19. 143; ps.-Dem. 7. 26), and included an enabling clause.
8. Peace of346(WA IP 331): It ended the Third Sacred War. The King
played no part in the peace, which was limited to Philip and most
members of the Delphic Amphiktyony, with Athens, Sparta, and
Corinth being conspicuously absent: Dem. 5; Fouilles de Delphes III.5,
nos. 19-20.
9. Founding of the so-called Hellenic League {SdA 11^ 343): The pact was
an alliance of the Athenians, Thebans, several Peloponnesian cities, and
various islands opposed to Philip, with Athens serving as hegemon.
The King was not involved, nor is the alliance called a koine eirene.
10. The League of Corinth {SdA III 403): Often called a koine eirene (ps.-
Dem. 17. 2, 4; Justin 9. 5. 1; see Plut. Phok. 16. 5), it was a treaty of
alliance and peace. The participants included Philip and "the Greeks,"
and excluded the King. The terms involved peace, alliance, and
recognition of Philip's hegemony. One of its principal aims was war
with the King (Justin 9. 5. 6; FGrH 255, 5).
Some conclusions follow from these sketchy observations, relating
primarily to terminology and participants. Contemporaries obviously had
no technical term for the peace treaties that the Greeks made either with the
King or among themselves. The original Peace of 386 (no. 1) could be
called either "peace" or "the so-called Peace of Antalkidas." It could even
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be called a koine eirene, should one accept the dubious restoration of the
term in line 13 of SdA IP 257. Both the Peace of 375 (no. 2) and both of
those of 371 (nos. 3-4) could be named the "King's Peace." In two cases
(nos, 6 and 10) contemporaries referred to a koine eirene, but in neither
instance was the King directly involved. Yet each peace was founded upon
the basic stipulations of the earlier treaties. Koine is merely descriptive.
When modifying eirene, it means nothing more than a general treaty of
peace, whether or not the King was directly involved, in which the majority
of the leading Greek cities settled their differences along the lines that had
become traditional following the original treaty of 386. Therefore, it is
erroneous to take Diodoros' koine eirene as a technical term, sanctioned by
diplomatic usage and so understood by all parties in the fourth century.
Rather, it is a modern, anachronistic, and incorrect concept, a major
misinterpretation of the evidence.
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